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This case study details the potential acquisition of Borealis Software by two entrepreneurs. It is intended 
to be used as an in-class case study in an Entrepreneurial Finance course, after pro formas and valuation 
have been covered, to illustrate normalizing and projecting financial statements to arrive at an estimate 
of future firm value. Students are asked to use the financial information given to create their own 
financial projections for Borealis should the entrepreneurs make the acquisition. Students can then 
decide whether the company is worth purchasing for the $12 million asking price. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It was February 2007, and Chris Mackey and Dan Smith had just signed a letter of intent to purchase 
Borealis Software, Inc., a 25-year-old company located in a suburb of Minneapolis, Minnesota. They had 
been pouring through documents, conducting interviews, performing secondary market research, and 
myriad other tasks in their due diligence. They were currently analyzing company data they had compiled 
in preparation for a presentation to their private equity investor on the financial attractiveness of the 
acquisition. A big part of this task involved interpreting the numbers that were provided by Borealis along 
with making assumptions about how these numbers may change if they were to take over and operate the 
company. They would have to be able to defend their analysis in their presentation. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
Chris Mackey started his career in 1983 as an intern for Net60, a local software firm. At the time, 
Chris was pursuing his undergraduate degree from the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota. 
He stayed with the company after graduating in 1986, eventually moving from a programmer position to 
manager. He got in at the ground level of the company, and was part of its growth from 40 to 400 
customers during these early years. 
In the mid-1990’s, Chris went back to St. Thomas to pursue his MBA. He also moved up to executive 
roles, first becoming Director of Business Development and then President and CEO. During Chris’ 
tenure as President and CEO, the company changed its focus to supply chain management software and 
grew from $8 million in revenue to $34 million in 2003, when it was acquired by 3M. Chris continued in 
the President and CEO role until 2006 and the company continued to grow at a 25% annual growth rate. 
 Dan Smith had spent his career in finance roles for various firms. He spent ten years as an accountant 
for Deloitte & Touche, and then moved into finance at Honeywell. One of his positions at Honeywell was 
CFO of a $1.8 billion business unit that undertook several acquisitions. He left Honeywell to become 
CFO of Contingency Software, which was sold in January 2003 for $160 million. He then joined Net60, 
where he and Chris worked together for the first time and helped to lead Net60 in the 3M acquisition (see 
Exhibit 1 for Net60 operational performance). 
 
THE NEXT VENTURE 
 
After their post-acquisition commitments to Net60 were up, Chris and Dan discussed teaming up on 
“the next venture.” From their experience in pursuing acquisitions at Net60, they had noticed a trend 
toward consolidation in the software industry. However, private equity firms needed to deploy too much 
money to take an interest in smaller software firms with less than $20-25 million in revenues. With over 
11,000 software firms under $20 million in revenue, they believed there was ample opportunity to pursue 
a consolidation strategy with smaller software firms. They could acquire 3-4 smaller software firms in a 
similar vertical market, resulting in revenues over $50 million and a potential exit to a private-equity or 
strategic buyer. They believed that such a sale would command a price of between 8 and 14 times 
EBITDA. 
In early 2007, they formed NextMove LLC, which would be the entity that would search for and 
acquire each firm. They approached a large capital firm, with whom Chris and Dan had established a 
close professional relationship, to fund the search. The firm invested $1.98 million in preferred stock, and 
Chris and Dan were in business (see Exhibit 2 for deal summary). 
 
BOREALIS SOFTWARE 
 
At the time they were forming NextMove, Chris and Dan were introduced to Borealis Software 
through an investment bank they had approached in beginning their search. Borealis had been founded in 
the mid-1980’s and the founder was now 65-years-old and looking to retire. After an initial look at the 
business, Chris and Dan submitted a letter of intent to purchase the stock of Borealis for approximately 
$12 million. This equated to about 1x revenue and 2x recurring revenue, which was low for software 
firms in general, but fairly consistent with acquisition multiples for very small, mature software 
companies (see Exhibits 3-8 for select data on Borealis). 
Borealis sold Computer Telephone Integration (CTI) software to specific vertical markets, with its 
main focus on the healthcare industry. Borealis’s CTI software unified telephone, paging, and computer 
information systems, and provided emergency notification and response capabilities. The software 
enabled organizations to reduce call center staff by 50% and to increase customer service via aspects such 
as increasing the likelihood of finding on-call staff. 
Chris and Dan were immediately attracted to Borealis’s market space. The CTI market was 
approximately $100 million, large enough to make money, but too small to attract large competitors like 
Cisco. Borealis was one of four market leaders, none of which held a dominant position. Healthcare 
organizations, and hospitals in particular, were what Chris and Dan referred to as “sticky”: they were 
unlikely to switch communications systems. 
Borealis had 80 employees and was on pace to generate $12 million in revenues for fiscal year 2007 
(year ending May 2007). The company had approximately 200 active customers, with the top ten 
customers accounting for 31% of revenues, and a 99.5% customer retention rate. Borealis generated 
revenue through four activities: 1) Software licensing, which included Borealis products and the resale of 
third party software; 2) Services, which included software installation and training; 3) 
Maintenance/Customer Support; and 4) Equipment.  Its software consisted of four main products: 
 Smart Console: Smart Console was the company’s main operator automation product, providing 
caller information on the operator’s computer screen for incoming calls, complete directory 
information, and single-button transfers. This product represented 50% of software revenue. 
  Smart Web: This product allowed people to find information for themselves via the web rather 
than contacting an operator. Directory information from the same database used by all Borealis 
applications was accessible through this platform. Smart Web represented 25% of software 
revenue. 
 Smart Speech: This was a voice-recognition product that allowed incoming calls to be answered 
by the system rather than a live operator. The system could then direct callers to the proper 
extension without human intervention. Smart Speech represented 15% of software revenue. 
 eNotify: This product was an emergency notification system in which users in a pre-defined 
group could be notified in a particular emergency situation. This product represented 10% of 
software revenues. 
Despite the company’s success, it had inconsistent growth and profitability and was performing less 
than optimal in many areas. There had been little in the way of software releases and no upgrades over the 
previous three years. The different software products had little consistency, with different looks and fonts. 
Additionally, although the company did not track expenses by revenue stream, it appeared by Chris’ and 
Dan’s estimates to be losing money on its professional services segment; from their due diligence, they 
attributed this to the company performing a significant amount of post-installation service for free rather 
than billing customers for it (see Exhibits 5 and 6). At the same time, these presented opportunities for 
Chris and Dan to add value if they were to take over the business. 
 
GO FOR IT? 
 
All of this had happened very quickly, and Chris and Dan wondered if this was the right opportunity 
or if something better might come along if they waited. Right now, their task was to figure out what the 
company might look like moving forward if they were to take over. Could Borealis alone provide an 
attractive return on $12 million in equity, even if they were unable to make subsequent acquisitions in this 
industry? And what upside existed if they could execute their consolidation strategy? Was this better than 
potential alternative acquisitions they might find? 
 
 
EXHIBIT 1 
SELECTED NET60 OPERATING RATIOS 
 
Revenue Source % of Total Revenue 
License 24.3% 
Services 39.1% 
Maintenance 18.4% 
Hardware 18.1% 
Cost of Sales % of Rev. Source 
License 4.3% 
Services 68.3% 
Maintenance 16.9% 
Hardware 80.6% 
Operating Expenses % of Total Revenue 
Product Devt 12.4% 
Sales 14.2% 
Marketing 6.7% 
G&A 4.1% 
Total Operating Expenses 37.3% 
 
 
 EXHIBIT 2 
CIBC DEAL SUMMARY 
 
 Total Investment Ownership % Type 
CIBC $1,980,000 79.2% Preferred Stock 
Management $20,000 0.8% Preferred Stock 
Carried Interest Pool  20.0% Common Stock 
 
 
EXHIBIT 3 
BOREALIS PAST INCOME STATEMENTS 
 
   FY07 
$ (000) FY05 FY06 8 Months 12 Months (est.) 
Gross Sales 9,474 11,915 7,778 13.255 
Net Sales 8,668 11,027 7,145 12,355 
Growth Rate  27% 6% 12% 
Gross Profit 5,235 7,073 4,354 7,810 
Gross Profit % 60.4% 64.1% 60.9% 63.2% 
Operating Income (929) 660 49 899 
Operating Income % (10.7%) 6.0% 0.7% 7.3% 
EBITDA (631) 1,000 289 1,259 
EBITDA % (7.3%) 9.1% 4.0% 10.2% 
 
 
EXHIBIT 4 
BOREALIS PAST BALANCE SHEETS 
 
$ (000) 5/31/05 5/31/06 1/31/07 Est. Closing 2/28/07 
Cash 1,512 1,680 2,397 1,887 
Accts Receivable 1,767 2,780 2,465 2,464 
Inventory 429 419 677 675 
Other Current Assets 157 237 307 295 
Total Current Assets 3,885 5,116 5,846 5,321 
Net Fixed Assets 591 615 688 688 
Other Assets 74 36 45 59 
Total Assets 4,530 5,767 6,579 6,068 
     
Current Debt 71 152 109 0 
Accts Payable 211 238 287 250 
Accrued Income Taxes - 38 20 20 
Accrued Liabilities 257 323 269 300 
Due to Call Connect 216 216 102 102 
Customer Deposits 1,296 1,606 2,381 2,400 
Deferred Income 3,208 3,406 3,334 3,636 
Total Current Liab. 5,259 5,979 6,502 6,708 
 Long-Term Debt 83 66 148 0 
Owners’ Equity (812) (278) (71) (640) 
Total Liab. & OE 4,530 5,767 6,579 6,068 
 
 
EXHIBIT 5 
BOREALIS REVENUE BY CATEGORY 
 
   FY07 
$ (000) FY05 FY06 8 Months 12 Months (est.) 
License 3,450 4,723 2,648 5,473 
Growth Rate (35%) 37%  16% 
Services/Training 1,496 1,953 1,211 1,881 
Growth Rate (23%) 31%  (4%) 
Maintenance 3,670 4,431 3,329 5,109 
Growth Rate 20% 21%  15% 
Equipment 858 808 379 792 
Growth Rate (45%) (6%)  (2%) 
 
 
EXHIBIT 6 
BOREALIS COST OF SALES BY CATEGORY 
 
   FY07 
$ (000) FY05 FY06 8 Months 12 Months (est.) 
License 256 357 231 468 
Services/Training 1,900 2,284 1,772 2,752 
Maintenance 678 720 520 780 
Equipment 599 593 268 545 
 
 
EXHIBIT 7 
BOREALIS EXPENSE ADJUSTMENTS 
 
$ (000) FY06 FY07 – total (est.) Projected Expense 
Owner Salary/Bonus/Benefits 461 892 240 
Trade Show Expenses 150 120 75 
Legal Fees 130 130 100 
Hiring Expenses 100 85 65 
Consultant Expense 0 20 0 
Marketing Brochures 0 10 0 
 
 
EXHIBIT 8 – BOREALIS SALES BY CUSTOMER 
 
Customer FY06 (000’s) % 
A 775 7.03% 
 B 430 3.90% 
C 357 3.24% 
D 336 3.05% 
E 333 3.02% 
F 289 2.62% 
G 251 2.28% 
H 232 2.10% 
I 211 1.91% 
J 211 1.91% 
Total Top Customers 3,425 31.06% 
 
 
TEACHING NOTE 
 
Purpose 
This case was written to fill a gap in case studies for entrepreneurial finance courses: one that puts 
students in the position of projecting financials to make a decision. The case provides financial details for 
a software company that two entrepreneurs are looking to acquire, and students are asked to normalize 
and project financials and to project an exit value to assist them in evaluating the opportunity. A major 
point of learning for students is in the fact that there are many directions they can take in their projections, 
so they are forced to make their own assumptions. This is a level of ambiguity with which most students 
are unfamiliar and uncomfortable, and it provides the instructor an opportunity to demonstrate how 
approach is more important than coming up with the “right” answer. 
 
Case Questions 
1. Using the information given in the case along with the estimated 2007 income statement 
numbers, prepare an adjusted/normalized 2007 income statement for Borealis. What is the 
EBITDA multiple based on your adjusted EBITDA?   
2. Using the information given in the case, project five years of income statements using the Excel 
spreadsheet. What assumptions did you use? 
3. Estimate an exit value in Year 5. What is the total accumulated cash over the five-year period? At 
a $12 million purchase price, what is the projected IRR? 
4. Should Chris and Dan move forward with the acquisition? Why or why not? 
 
Classroom Strategy 
An effective strategy for this case is to have students read the case before class and then work in 
groups for 45-60 minutes during class to do the analysis. It is best to provide students with an Excel 
spreadsheet template (see Exhibit TN-1; this is an example of a completed spreadsheet, but the instructor 
can easily create a blank spreadsheet in Excel with just headings and no numbers). However, the 
instructor should give few instructions at the beginning of class on how to approach making adjustments 
to the 2007 income statement and developing pro formas. It will generally take the groups ten or fifteen 
minutes (along with a question or two for the instructor) to figure out the approach they will take. The 
instructor can monitor progress and leave about 30-40 minutes to go through the projections and other 
discussion points with the class. Instructors can expect to spend approximately 75-90 minutes total on the 
case if it is done as an in-class case study. 
 
Case Analysis 
There is a lot of information given in the exhibits, some of which is relevant to this analysis and some 
of which is not. This is intentional, as it gives students the challenge of sifting through the numbers, just 
as they would have to do if they were performing due diligence on an actual acquisition target. 
 Additionally, it is important to point out to students (even before they begin their analysis) that there isn’t 
one correct answer; it is their approach that is important. To that end, the analysis that follows in this 
teaching note provides one set of assumptions and the logic behind them, but instructors and students can 
certainly come up with and justify other approaches as well. 
 
Question 1: Adjusted/Normalized 2007 Income Statement 
Looking at the exhibits in the case, the two most glaring adjustments that need to be made are in the 
gross margin on Service (Exhibits 5 and 6) and in the Operating Expenses (Exhibit 7). From their 
previous experience at Net60 (Exhibit 1), Chris and Dan knew that software firms should generate an 
approximately 30% margin on service. What Chris and Dan found in their due diligence is that Borealis 
was that they didn’t realize they were losing money on this; they were simply not charging for most post-
installation service even though the expense of service was being incurred. While this would take time to 
correct, they thought they could eventually do so. Pricing service to generate a 30% margin on $2,752,000 
of costs would increase the service revenue from $1,881,000 to $3,931,000 (see TN-1). 
Looking at Exhibit 7, Chris and Dan expected to reduce operating expenses by $777,000. This is 
something that can take immediate effect if they go ahead and purchase the business. The instructor can 
note here how common it is in small business for an owner to either over- or under-compensate 
herself/himself and accumulate other expenses that would not be there with more professional 
management in place. These added expenses essentially reduce the acquisition price by decreasing 
EBITDA. 
Together, these adjustments would increase EBITDA by about $2.8 million and EBITDA percentage 
from 10.2% to 28.4%, which is far closer to the 34% average among software firms noted in the Stern 
School of Business study on margins1. At an EBITDA of $4 million, the acquisition multiple goes down 
from 12 to 3, indicating the potential for Chris and Dan to create significant value in Borealis simply by 
implementing changes in pricing and spending to reflect more normal industry practices. 
Of course, there are other changes that could be made and that students will ask about. One is that the 
proportion of revenue generated by Net60 through licensing, service, maintenance, and equipment is 
significantly different than Borealis. Some students will want to adjust revenues to those percentages, 
which is okay. However, we don’t know if it is reasonable to expect this given that Borealis operates with 
a different customer base. Another is that Net60’s costs for licensing and equipment (4.3% and 80.6%) 
are also different than Borealis’s (8.6% and 68.8%). It would certainly be reasonable to change these, but 
they would have minimal impact as they result in relatively small changes in dollars and more or less 
offset each other. 
 
Question 2: Pro Formas 
Once students have made assumptions about what “normal” operating performance would be, they 
can start to build out income statements for the next five years. In Exhibit TN-1, the main assumptions 
used in the pro formas are as follows: 
 Revenue Growth = 10% per year. It can be debated whether this is optimistic or conservative, but 
given revenue growth over the past two years of 27% and 12%, along with Chris’ and Dan’s track 
record, it could be argued that this is a reasonable assumption (and, of course, anything higher 
would create a more attractive scenario). This growth rate was assumed for the License, 
Maintenance, and Equipment revenue streams. 
 The Service revenue stream takes five years to get pricing to a 30% gross margin. At a growth 
rate of 10% per year, cost of service in year 5 would be $4,432,000, and service revenue would be 
$6,632,000 to achieve a 30% margin. For lack of a better assumption, the growth in Service 
revenue was split equally among the five years. 
 Cost of sales for Licensing, Maintenance, and Equipment remained constant as a percent of each 
revenue stream (so each one increased by 10% per year). 
  Operating Expenses were based on a percent of net sales. This was set to the percent from the 
adjusted 2007 income statement ($6,134,000/$14,405,000 = 42.6%). 
 Depreciation/Amortization remained constant each year at $360,000 (based on 2007 numbers). 
While these assumptions are relatively simple, the instructor can stress to students that in reality, 
assumptions don’t need to be overly complex – they just need to be justifiable. The instructor can also 
show the students how to perform sensitivity analysis by assuming different growth rates, different 
growth in pricing of services, and/or different operating expenses. This will show students the level of 
risk in missing target growth rates, etc. 
 
Question 3: Accumulated Cash, IRR 
If we use EBITDA as a proxy for cash, the total accumulated cash from Exhibit TN-1 over the five-
year period is $24.3 million. If we assume an exit value of 12 x EBITDA, the exit value in year 5 would 
be 12 x $6,233,000 = $74.8 million, for a total of $24.3 + $74.8 = $99.1 million. At an investment of $12 
million, this comes out to a projected IRR of 53%. 
The instructor can demonstrate different scenarios here as well. For instance, even at only a 3% 
revenue growth rate, the accumulated cash is $74.6 million and the IRR is 44%; this illustrates how 
significant the opportunity is for implementing pricing changes in service and changes in operating 
expenses. Additionally, if Chris and Dan are able to make a second acquisition in this industry with 
similar financial potential, there is even more upside to acquiring Borealis. 
 
Question 4: Should They Make the Acquisition? 
There isn’t a right or wrong answer here either, but with the potential financial upside and Chris’ and 
Dan’s experience, it seems like a good bet. Also, with the limited information given in the case, Borealis 
is in an attractive market with products that add significant value to its customers, has high customer 
retention, is somewhat protected from competition, and has revenues spread out among customers (see 
Exhibit 8). If Chris and Dan can implement the changes in service pricing and the changes in operational 
expenses and simply maintain the customer base Borealis currently has, they can create significant value 
without growing the company at all. And, if they are able to make additional acquisitions that have the 
same type of upside, this could be an even larger opportunity. 
 
Epilogue 
Chris and Dan decided to close the deal and took over Borealis in March of 2007. Between March 
2007 and February 2009, Borealis acquired four additional companies (including Borealis, these 
companies generated $41 million in revenue at the time of acquisition). They invested a significant 
amount of capital into technology upgrades and product consistency. They also spent a great deal of effort 
on employee morale post-acquisition, through surveying employees, implementing employee suggestions, 
and offering all employees stock options. 
In early 2010, they introduced a product called Borealis Connect, which was created as a pager 
replacement. This product allowed pages to be sent to a mobile phone and would disable the phone until 
the user acknowledged that he/she received the page (eliminating the possibility for someone to claim 
they didn’t receive a page when in fact they did). This product caught on quickly with hospitals and also 
caught the eye of strategic partners who needed a product to supersede actual pagers. 
In March of 2011, Borealis was acquired for $162.5 million. At the time, the five acquired companies 
that were now Borealis were generating $60 million in revenue and approximately 22% EBITDA 
margins. 
 
 
EXHIBIT TN-1 
PRO FORMA WORKSHEET 
 
 2006 2007 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 (est.) (adj.) 
Sales: 
License 
Services 
Maint. 
Equip. 
Total 
Discounts 
Net Sales 
 
4,723 
1,953 
4,431 
808 
11,915 
888 
11,027 
 
5,473 
1,881 
5,109 
792 
12,355 
900 
12,355 
 
5,473 
3,931 
5,109 
792 
15,305 
900 
14,405 
 
6,020 
2,771 
5,620 
871 
15,283 
1,038 
14,245 
 
6,622 
3,661 
6,182 
958 
17,424 
1,183 
16,241 
 
7,285 
4,552 
6,800 
1,054 
19,690 
1,337 
18,353 
 
8,013 
5,442 
7,480 
1,160 
22,094 
1,500 
20,594 
 
8,814 
6,332 
8,228 
1,276 
24,650 
1,674 
22,976 
COS: 
License 
Services 
Maint. 
Equip. 
Total 
 
357 
2,284 
720 
593 
3,955 
 
468 
2,752 
780 
545 
4,547 
 
468 
2,752 
780 
545 
4,547 
 
515 
3,027 
858 
600 
5,000 
 
566 
3,330 
944 
659 
5,499 
 
623 
3,663 
1,038 
725 
6,049 
 
685 
4,029 
1,142 
798 
6,654 
 
754 
4,432 
1,256 
878 
7,320 
Gr. Profit 
Gr. Profit % 
7,072 
64.1% 
7,808 
63.2% 
9,859 
68.4% 
9,245 
64.9% 
10,741 
66.1% 
12,304 
67.0% 
13,490 
67.7% 
15,656 
68.1% 
Op. Expenses 
Op. Profit 
Op. Profit % 
6,413 
659 
6.0% 
6,911 
897 
7.3% 
6,134 
3,725 
25.9% 
6,066 
3,180 
22.3% 
6,916 
3,826 
23.6% 
7,815 
4,489 
24.5% 
8,769 
5,171 
25.1% 
9,784 
5,873 
25.6% 
EBITDA 
EBITDA % 
999 
9.1% 
1,257 
10.2% 
4,085 
28.4% 
3,540 
24.8% 
4,186 
25.8% 
4,849 
26.4% 
5,531 
26.9% 
6,233 
27.1% 
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1.  New York University, Stern School of Business (2013). “Margins by Sector.” 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/margin.html. 
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